Abstract
In July 2025, the UK government proposed legislation to ban ransomware payments by public sector organizations and operators of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), including entities such as the National Health Service (NHS), local councils, and schools. This report provides an in-depth analysis of the proposed ban, examining its legal frameworks, enforcement challenges, potential economic and operational impacts, and drawing comparative analyses with similar policies in other countries. Additionally, the report delves into the ethical considerations of ‘no pay’ policies and assesses the long-term effectiveness and potential unintended consequences for both government and private industries.
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
1. Introduction
Ransomware attacks have emerged as a significant threat to global cybersecurity, targeting both public and private sector entities. The UK’s proposed ban on ransomware payments represents a proactive approach to mitigating this threat. This report aims to critically assess the proposed legislation, considering its implications within the broader context of cybersecurity policy and international practices.
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
2. Legal Frameworks and Legislative Proposals
2.1 The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill
The proposed ban is encapsulated within the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, introduced in July 2024. This legislation seeks to update the existing Network and Information Security Regulations 2018, known as UK NIS, to strengthen the UK’s cyber defenses and resilience against hostile attacks. The bill aims to ensure that critical infrastructure and essential digital services are protected by addressing vulnerabilities and enhancing the digital economy’s growth potential. (en.wikipedia.org)
2.2 Scope of the Ban
The ban targets public sector bodies and CNI operators, including the NHS, local councils, and schools, prohibiting them from paying ransom demands. Private sector organizations outside the ban are required to notify the government before making any payments, allowing authorities to provide guidance and ensure compliance with sanctions laws. (reuters.com)
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
3. Enforcement Challenges
3.1 Defining Enforcement Mechanisms
The UK government has yet to detail the precise enforcement model for the proposed ban. Questions remain around proportionality, especially for victims, the risk of ‘re-victimizing’ organizations with penalties, and how enforcement will operate across borders or group structures. (hsfkramer.com)
3.2 Potential Unintended Consequences
Critics argue that the ban could lead to unintended consequences, such as cybercriminals shifting their focus to private sectors that remain vulnerable. Additionally, mandatory reporting and payment restrictions could drive ransomware responses underground, with organizations mislabeling incidents to avoid reputational damage or regulatory scrutiny. (cfc.com)
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
4. Economic and Operational Impacts
4.1 Financial Implications for Public Sector Entities
The ban could lead to extended disruption of essential services, as public sector organizations may be unable to recover without paying a ransom. This has prompted calls for narrow exceptions in national security or threat to life situations and for greater investment in contingency planning. (hsfkramer.com)
4.2 Impact on Private Sector Organizations
Private companies outside the ban are required to notify the government before paying a ransom demand. Early notification could help companies get clarity on whether a ransom payment might put them in breach of sanctions or terrorism-financing laws. However, involving authorities could complicate and potentially slow down incident response in the heat of the crisis, especially if any formal approval is required. (hsfkramer.com)
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5. Comparative Analyses with International Policies
5.1 United States
In the United States, some states, such as North Carolina and Florida, have implemented partial bans prohibiting state agencies from paying ransoms. However, at the federal level, proposals to ban the payment of ransomware demands have been rejected. (dacbeachcroft.com)
5.2 Australia
Australia has introduced mandatory ransomware reporting for certain businesses to report ransom payments. The Cyber Security Act mandates that a ‘reporting business entity’ must make a report within 72 hours of making the ransomware payment. (dacbeachcroft.com)
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
6. Ethical Considerations of ‘No Pay’ Policies
6.1 Victim Blaming and Revictimization
Critics have raised concerns about criminalizing or revictimizing victims, which could make organizations more reluctant to come forward and report ransomware incidents. The reality is that many organizations have historically chosen to pay ransoms out of a pragmatic desire to resume operations quickly while minimizing costs. (information-age.com)
6.2 Balancing Public Safety and Cybersecurity
The ban could lead to unintended consequences, such as cybercriminals shifting their focus to private sectors that remain vulnerable. Additionally, mandatory reporting and payment restrictions could drive ransomware responses underground, with organizations mislabeling incidents to avoid reputational damage or regulatory scrutiny. (cfc.com)
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
7. Long-Term Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences
7.1 Potential Shifts in Cybercriminal Behavior
The ban may not deter attacks entirely, as attackers could exploit public data or engage in other crimes like fraud and extortion. Moreover, some argue that the prohibition limits the ability of organizations to weigh the costs of ransom versus remediation, which can sometimes exceed ransom demands. (itpro.com)
7.2 Impact on Cyber Insurance Markets
The ban could fundamentally impact cyber insurance markets, leading to a rise in insurance premiums. Insurance firms may be required to support more expensive routes to recovery, fundamentally impacting cyber insurance markets and leading to a rise in insurance premiums. (infosecurity-magazine.com)
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8. Recommendations
8.1 Implementing Controlled Exceptions
A balanced approach is recommended, where the ransomware payment ban is implemented but allows payments in exceptional circumstances with explicit government agency approval. This maintains the deterrent while providing flexibility when public safety is at stake, all while ensuring attacks are reported to relevant authorities. (cyberresilience.com)
8.2 Strengthening Cybersecurity Measures
Organizations should invest in robust cybersecurity measures, including modernizing IT infrastructure, using up-to-date security tools, maintaining offline backups, and having well-rehearsed incident response plans. This proactive approach can reduce the likelihood of successful attacks and mitigate potential disruptions. (hsfkramer.com)
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
9. Conclusion
The UK’s proposed ban on ransomware payments represents a significant shift in cybersecurity policy, aiming to disrupt the financial incentives for cybercriminals targeting public sector entities and CNI operators. While the intent is commendable, the implementation of such a ban requires careful consideration of enforcement mechanisms, potential unintended consequences, and the broader impact on both public and private sectors. A nuanced approach that balances deterrence with operational resilience is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the policy and the continued protection of critical services.
Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.
This is a timely and important analysis. The discussion around potential shifts in cybercriminal behavior is especially critical. How might international collaboration in tracking and prosecuting these actors need to evolve to address such shifts effectively?
Thanks for your insightful comment! The evolution of international collaboration is key. Stronger information sharing agreements and harmonized legal frameworks could significantly improve our ability to track and prosecute cybercriminals operating across borders. It’s a complex challenge, but a vital one!
Editor: MedTechNews.Uk
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So, if public sector organisations can’t pay, will they start offering cybercriminals in-kind services instead? Perhaps a lucrative contract or two? Just brainstorming here!
That’s a very interesting thought! It does raise questions about the potential for alternative incentives, and how we might need to broaden our understanding of what constitutes a ‘payment’ in these scenarios. Perhaps focusing on preventative measures and resilience building is the strongest defense against such possibilities.
Editor: MedTechNews.Uk
Thank you to our Sponsor Esdebe
The report’s point about “controlled exceptions” is key. Clear guidelines around those exceptions, perhaps tied to independent audits and demonstrable cybersecurity maturity, could provide needed flexibility without undermining the ban’s overall deterrent effect.